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since 1945, has been appointed automatically as Governor.
This non-elected Governor is a reward for the Sultanate’s
historical role in Indonesia’s revolution and independence.
This region remains very unique, well known as a cultural
city and university town, as well as a place of interaction
between the modern and traditional (Nakamura 1984),
since Javanese-Hindu religions have mixed with modernist
Islamic groups to produce a syncretic ‘Javanese’ religion as
described by Clifford Geertz (1964) and by Woodward
(1989).
In Indonesian history, Yogyakarta has been both a
Kingdom and part of Indonesia during the Dutch colonial
period, the Old Older, the New Order and in the reform
movements. The Kingdom of Yogyakarta played a key role
in opposing and fighting against the colonizers to gain
independence of Indonesia. In the Old Order era, Sultan
Hamengku Buwono IX negotiated the social and political
changes at foot during the earliest stages of independence
by providing full support to the founding of the Republic of
Indonesia. Since Yogyakarta was considered autonomous by
the Dutch, the Sultan “requested” Sukarno to grant inde-
pendent and sovereign status to the Kingdom, and such
special status was enshrined in the Charter of Sukarno’s
Determination dated October 16, 1945 (Woodward, 2010).
As a result of Java and Yogyakarta’s special political
status, the image of Javanese communities deteriorated in
the eyes of non-Javanese. Suharto’s leadership style, in line
with Javanese tradition, was thick with mystical rituals and
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ABSTRACT:
In response to an uncertain political situation, since
1998, Yoyakartans have engaged in resistance
through groups called indigenous organizations.
Such groups reproduce existing cultural resources
as part of a broader movement to oppose democra-
tization reforms that have been raised by the central
government. Based on interviews, fieldwork and
newspaper reports, this study finds that: (1) collec-
tive identity can be understood in different ways from
political and cultural perspectives, and indigenous
groups are part of the “deep cultural resources” that
establish collective identity; (2) such organizations
use cultural resources in ways that conform to social
movement theory; and (3) the existence of indig-
enous groups contributes to shaping and reshaping
the activities of the movements in which they partici-
pate.
Keywords: social movement, collective identity, pro-
test tactics, liberal democracy.
INTRODUCTION
Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta (DIY), has
special political status in Indonesia equiva-
lent to the provincial level.  More pre-
cisely, it enjoys a special status as the
cultural center of Java and as a continua-
tion of the Mataram Kingdom, which
continues to be ruled by a hereditary
Sultanate. The Sultan rules as both a
cultural figure and a political leader and,
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traditions intended to perpetuate his power, which
fed on the syncretic Javanese religion, combining
the teachings of Javanese indigenous religions with
those of Hinduism and Islam (Geertz 1976; Ander-
son 1984 ; Woodward 1989:199-201).  William
Liddle has found that the role of the Palace and
Sultan in Yogyakarta’s regional development is
significant and cannot be overlooked (Liddle,
Kompas  2/7/2011).
Unlike Fukuyama (1992), who believes the
history of government will end with a system of
liberal democracy, Faith (2006) in his book Decline
of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia states that
parliamentarian democracy (which is understood as
liberal democracy) failed to be implemented during
the Sukarno Era in Indonesia. The failure of
liberal democracy contributes to popular beliefs in
and advocacy for local traditions and culture,
regardless of whether such local systems are demo-
cratic or undemocratic. Freedom and peace appear
in such cases to be goals that motivate people more
than an abstract concept of democracy.
From above explanation, this paper aims to
examine how the process of collective identity
building among social movement organizations,
participants, and audiences in Yogyakarta played
out during protest events. The relationship be-
tween collective identity and collective action is a
puzzle that is closely examined in this paper.
RESEARCH METHODS
The data analyzed in this study are derived from
interviews and fieldwork conducted during the
peak of the protest movement in 2011. About 30
protest participants and leaders were interviewed
in formal and informal conversations. Following
Goodwin et al. (2004), I employed in-depth inter-
views so as to gather more systematic information
about the emotions and strategies of leaders. This
type of methodology is generally described as
participant observation, that is, talking with people
to study the everyday emotional culture of a social
movement (Goodwin, Jasper, Polleta, 2004: 424).
To supplement the data from these interviews, I
also collected data from national and local newspa-
per reports. Selected data were then coded and
interpreted to answer questions concerning the
processes of collective identity and protest tactics
from 2003-2012. also what is the nature of the
relationships between social movement organiza-
tions (SMOs) and indigenous groups.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
Social movements can be defined as instances of
collective action, whether they are led and moti-
vated by economic or class-consciousness or other
causes like identity and civil rights. The first case is
an example of early social movements that arose
mostly in Europe, while the latter are exemplified
by more recent social movements. A common
assumption underlying this definition is that,
“shared grievance and generalized belief (loose
ideologies) about the cause and possible means of
reducing grievance are important precondition for
the emergence of a social movement” (McCharty
and Zald 1977:1214). Nonetheless, participants
have their own rationality to participate or not in
movement activities. Additionally, social move-
ments or collective action involve components
such as constituents, adherents, and beneficiaries;
proponent and opponent (McCharty and Zald
1977); protagonist and antagonist groups (counter
movements), and audiences (Hunt, Benford, and
Snow 1994); resources; social movement organiza-
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tions (SMOs) (McCharty and Zald 1977; McAdam
1982); leadership (Tarrow); tactic and strategy (Tilly
2008; McAdam; Levitsky).  A social movement
organization (SMO) is a complex, or formal,
organization which identifies its goal with the
preference of a social movement or a counter-
movement and attempts to implement those goals
(McCharty and Zald 1977: 1218).
Protesters typically need a so-called ‘common
enemy.’ Additionally, in the framing process,
collective action has three functions which are
“diagnostic,” “prognostic,” “and motivational”
(Snow and Benford 1998). Meanwhile Gamson
more focuses  on “injustice,” “agency,” and “iden-
tity.” Collective identity is form of “collective
representation” (Durkheim). For this study, I wish
to expand upon Melucci’s notion of identity (1989:
34-5), as quoted below:
“Collective identity is an interactive and shared
definition produced by several interacting individuals
who are concerned with the orientations of their
action as well as the field of opportunities and
constraints in which their action take place. The
process of constructing, maintaining, and altering a
collective identity provides the basic for actors to
shape their expectation and calculate the costs and
benefit of the action … collective identity is thus a
process in which actors produce the common cognitive
frameworks that enable them to assess their environ-
ment and to calculate the cost and benefit of their
action. They definition which they formulate are in
part the result of negotiated interaction and relation-
ships of influence and in part the fruit of emotional
recognition.”
Taylor and Whittier (1992) examine the pro-
cesses by which collective identity is constructed
and contested to reach goals of a protest move-
ment. Movements may broaden or tighten aspects
of identity, which may be unavoidable by design or
may involve the invention of new traditions, such
as the creation of hip-hop using Javanese language,
or the use of ritual ceremonies during protest
events. The construction of collective or shared
identity itself can be done by using multilevel and
diverse activities such as public discourse through
talk, framing process, narrative, interaction among
others, media, storytelling and legitimate cultural
activities (Hunt and Benford 2004: 445). Addition-
ally, collective identity itself is a requisite compo-
nent for collective action, and they may grow from
each other (Hunt and Benford 2004: 450-1) due to
the importance of solidarity, commitment and
emotional ties among protest participants.
Hunt and Benford (2004) have defined collec-
tive identity as the conceptions by which individu-
als identify themselves collectively in cognitive,
emotional, and moral terms. Rooted in and
shaped by particular socio-cultural contexts, collec-
tive identities are produced and reproduced in
ongoing interaction between allies, oppositional
forces, and audiences, who can be real or imag-
ined. While providing a sense of “We-ness” and
collective agency, collective identity likewise creates
a sense of “Other” via boundary identification,
construction and maintenance. Collective identity
is, thus, shared meaning, providing cultural context
for planning, enabling, carrying out, and evaluat-
ing individual participation and collective actions.
In addition, collective identity is the main charac-
teristic of new social movements worldwide, includ-
ing collective action that may be led by class con-
sciousness or economic concerns.
New social movements that have arisen follow-
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ing collapses of authoritarian regimes worldwide
tend to follow “identity-oriented paradigms”
(Cohen 1985) under the banner of postmodernism
or social constructionism (B. Epstein 1990). In line
with such theoretical frameworks, Williams (2004)
examines shifts among collective movement from
bases for economic distribution to new identities,
moral concerns, and civil rights issues.  For this
study, I define new social movements as those that
are based in culture and that produce and repro-
duce new collective identities throughout a framing
process or public discourse.
         
RESULT AND ANALYSIS
The dynamics of power relations became quite
interesting in Indonesia when the New Order
government fell on May 21, 1998, amid massive
popular and student protests. Yogyakarta, as a
center of cultural legitimacy for the rulers, also
played a role in supporting reform. The Sultan
took part in reforms for democratization, and
ultimately the people of Yogyakarta supported the
appointment of the Sultan as governor of
Yogyakarta. This could be a blessing from the
reform. Negotiations are political, and traditions
can be justified. The success of popular pressure in
maintaining this tradition is often interpreted
differently by different groups. One the one hand,
it can be seen as a tribute to the historical role of
Yogyakarta during periods of revolution and
reform. On the other hand, the appointment of
the Sultan as governor can be seen as a counter-
reformation movement.
In Yogyakarta, identity has played an important
role in almost every single collective movement,
both in building numbers of supporters and partici-
pants. Multiple levels of identity are involved, such
as individual, societal, organizational identities
based on shared beliefs, or identities as framed by
elites through media and other instruments. Not
surprisingly, collective identity is broadened,
tightened, and even reconstructed by design as
newly invented traditions for the purpose of
effectively gaining the notice of audiences. This is
obvious in the case of Yogyakarta, where activists
mobilize people regardless the age, religion, and
ethnicity.
The creation and reshaping of collective identity
for social movements in Yogyakarta are best traced
in several ways, and these include internal and
external processes. Internal processes are ways in
which collective identity is constructed from exist-
ing cultural resources, such as shared memories,
symbols, myths, values, codes, traditions, and
rituals. Since such notions are embedded in the
everyday lives of people, they are easily politicized
so as to influence them in supporting the goals of a
movement.
On the other hand, are forces by which protest-
ers try to appropriate other cultures or social
elements as part of their social movement. For
instance, the use of electronic social networking
tools, blogs, local and national newspaper, and
collaborative music that crosses ethnic boundaries.
They contribute to the formation of collective
identity building for the Yogyanese, Javanese, or
“Kawulo Mataram” and they can also frame such
new traditions as a new multiethnic identity. This
is the form of collective identity which is typically
constructed by social movement organization
(SMO).
Second, consciousness is how social movement
participants define the need for Yogyakarta’s
special status based on their traditional belief and
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‘cultural resources’ (Melucci 1995) and, by doing so,
they can build support among the public. Based on
varying interpretations of cultural heritage, they
understand how local traditions will help them to
maintain their dignity and prosperity under the
Sultinate’s rule.   Shared identity is one component
of social action, which can be internalized through
formal and informal educational institutions from
generation to generation. Unsurprisingly, protest-
ers come from larger social groups, including
highly educated, less well educated, and even
uneducated people to support the privileges of
Yogyakarta. In addition, indigenous groups have
shaped such historical and future consciousness.
The past is framed as an ideal, and the future
should be modeled on the past. This is a common
belief in Yogyakarta.  Therefore, every external
threat that endangers such traditional beliefs and
myths will meet with strong resistance. Moreover,
strong social cohesion among members of indig-
enous groups allows them to act collectively.
Meanwhile, negotiation requires both direct
and indirect strategies to challenge a dominant
group, namely, the state. Protesters have their own
understandings and beliefs about power relations,
democracy, and traditions, and therefore they
mobilize a variety of symbols to oppose the central
government..
Collective identity is also formed also through
emotional and psychological ties. The new collec-
tive identity is thus not just Javanese but is con-
strued as a broader, Indonesian community
marked by multiethnic groups.  Protesters thus
bring together both the flags of Yogyakarta and
Indonesia during protest events. This makes it
clear that they are not a separatist movement,
countering the claims of a radical group named
“Posko Referendem” that has challenged the
central government to get regional freedom
(Interview with Posko Referendum volunteer 6/8/
FIGURE 1: ACTIVITIES AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN YOGYAKARTA
Source: Adapted from newspaper reports in Kompas and Kedaulatan Rakyat.
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2011; Kompas 12/5/2010).
Social movements and protest movements take
different forms and employ different tactics,
depending on the context. While the state has
certain powers to shape and reshape the activities
of social movements, we may argue to the contrary
that social movements also influence the type of
state regime and that they can transform their
strategies such that the state acts in ways that are
less oppressive.
The table ( Figure 1) summarizes the protest
tactics and its characteristics of social movements in
Yogyakarta Post-Suharto regime.
SMOs are those organizations in a movement
that explicitly organize their members. The four
SMOs I focus on here are GRY (The People’s
Movement of Yogyakarta); Gentaraja (United
Yogya Movement); Sekber Gamawan (Association
for the Special Status of Yogyakarta); and lastly
Posko Referendum (Referendum). I then consider
several characteristics among these SMOs, includ-
ing their main supporters, identities, goals, rela-
tionship to the palace, tactics, and strategies.
On the one hand, the diversity and variations in
the movements can be seen as strengthening their
primary purpose of supporting each other, because
together they can reach a broader audience of
towns and villages, as well as religious and ethnic
groups. Another advantage is that the government
cannot easily co-opt such an array of groups having
collective-collegial leadership (though there are
exceptions where IGs have a centralized leadership
that joins with other organizations in the same
SMOs). On the other hand, the diversity of these
SMOs can alternatively lead to fragmentation and
conflict. Gentaraja, for example, is a new SMO
that grew from disillusionment with GRY, while
the Joint Secretariat of Gamawan was originally
part of Gentaraja (Interview with Adji Bancono,
13/8/ 2011) and became its own SMO. This can
TABLE 2: CHARACTERSITICS OF SMOS IN YOGYAKARTA MOVEMENT 1998-2011
Source: Adapted from interviews and newspaper reports from Kompas and Kedaulatan Rakyat.
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result in detrimental public relations, since discord
can be considered as pointing to ulterior political
and personal interests among SMO leaders. If so,
the public may be reluctant to join in protest.
One radical group that does not use street
demonstrations or political negotiation is called
Command Post Referendum. They prefer a cul-
tural approach because such activities can not be
easily contaminated by political interests. Propo-
nents of this group are militant have strong social
relationships and traditional values. The largest
protest activities include the mubeng benteng (a
traditional ceremony of silently circling the palace),
an event I witnessed once out of the three times it
was held. In the event I saw, thousands of people
participated in the activity, which lasted from noon
to 5:00 pm.
It can be seen differences in the characteristics
of these SMOs. Every choice has consequences for
both supporters and groups of antagonists, includ-
ing the central government. If certain groups are
found to be too pragmatic and political, they may
elicit a response in the streets, which would affect
the internal dynamics of the SMO itself. The
image of the movement is important for the
maintenance of continuity and integrity. Demon-
strations are framed in terms of new concepts of
democracy rather than forms of mass action that
display symptoms of a “social disease” or expres-
sions of people who have lost in the struggle for
TABLE 3: PROTEST EVENTS IN YOGYAKARTA
Sources: Kompas, Kadaulatan Rakyat, personal field notes.
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economic resources. Good public images can win
the hearts and minds of people, and negative
images can drive them away.  GRY is a good
example of how the political interests of certain
elites have led to the collapse of organization that
existed for nearly 10 years.
For a better understanding of protest dynamics,
an additional chart summarizing several notable
protest events held from 1998 to 2011:
Based on selected data from the local and
national newspapers Kedaulatan Rakyat and Kompas
from January 1998 to October 2011, the types of
protest events can be summarized below:
TABLE 4: FREQUENCY OF PROTEST ACTIVITIES BY TYPE, JAN. 1998 – OCT.
2011
Source: Kompas and Kedaulatan Rakyat.
Following Tarrow, protest events can be divided
into three groups, namely, confrontation, violence,
and conventional (1995: 98). Confrontation
includes collective action involving large masses of
people but which lack violence, such as the occupa-
tion, obstruction and forced entry of spaces, as well
as radical strikes. Like confrontation, conventional
protests are also non-violent, and this category
includes petitions, legal action, demonstrations,
leafleting, mass gatherings, and public assemblies.
Meanwhile, violent protests include looting, riots,
shootings, and so on. In the case of Yogyakarta, the
violent events were minor and occurred only in
1998 and 2008, when GRY employed terror
against groups that opposed its movement.
Kompak has been reported, what McCharthy and
Zald (1977: 1218) theory, as a countermovement
organization in 2008 and was threatened by many
actors at that time (Interviews with Budi Setiawan
7/7/2011; Pambudi 7/16/2011; Wahyu 8/12/
2011).  They define that a countermovement is a
set of opinions and beliefs in a population that is
opposed to a social movement. An additional type
of protest event that does not fit nicely within this
framework are so-called cultural events, which
serve as a way of delivering the message of protests
through rites, festival, shadow puppet shows,
traditional village cleansing, and art performances.
From Table 3 above, we can actually see the
pattern where the frequency of protest activity
increased. From 1998 to 2011, the office of gover-
nor of Yogyakarta has continued to be extended by
domestic minister without election process. In 1998
the major transition of government nationally had
an impact on traditional community responses to
save the region from liberal democracy. Each of
these extensions was preceded by protest move-
ments supporting the establishment of the Sultan
as governor and expressly rejecting an electoral
system.
The motivations of participants involved in this
movement can be grouped into three categories:
motivation founded on past agreements and
historical awareness, motivation stemming from
feelings of social solidarity, and motivation from
emotional ties with the figure of the Sultan as
symbolic and ritual leader as well as political leader
(Astuti & Palupi in Kompas 6/12/2010). If we trace
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the reasons for each of these, there is a variety of
emotional and psychological roots that lead to
strong beliefs in tradition, which are in line with
Javanese beliefs in supernatural powers, as Geertz
(1964), Anderson (1972), and Woordward (2010)
have each found, namely, that power is symbolized
by the charismatic figure of Sultan and inheritance
as the real power base.
Such traditional beliefs are powerful in
Yogyanese communities, and they are taken for
granted as undeniable “truth,” which can give rise
to militants and radical protesters.  As Goodwin et
al. (2004) argue, the emotional dimension is part
of social action but, unfortunately, it is underesti-
mated by many scholars. From the perspective of
antagonist groups, they argue that emotional and
irrational movements will quickly dissipate because
they lack strategy and political calculation while
having only a minor political effect. They further
criticize that spontaneous protests driven by emo-
tional groups are not worth worrying about, since
they are only short-term events (interviews with
Budi Setiawan July 17/7/2011 and with Putut 12/
8/2011). Nevertheless, such protest movements
have declined and reemerged for a decade already.
Thus, despite the existence of an apprently “irratio-
nal” or “emotional” dimension, participants have
built their common beliefs into a movement of
collective action, which can be effective precisely
because of the emotional content, sense of belong-
ing and primordial sentiments embedded within
public beliefs and expressed in everyday life. Thus,
cultural or emotional collective action might
emerge and reemerge as responses to dominant
groups, turning resistance to change into a part of
everyday life.
CONCLUSION
Based on the discussion above, several points
can be summarized my findings: (1) a new social
movement has emerged in contemporary Indone-
sia nation wide especially in the post-reform era
since 1998, in which cultural resources or what we
call local identity have become the basis for mobi-
lizing and framing of collective movements; (2)
indigenous groups have been playing an important
role in shaping and reshaping both SMOs and the
continuity of collective movements; (3) fragmenta-
tion on political interests can lead to the decline of
a movement, as was the case with GRY and Keris
Jati; (4) collective identities are produced and
reproduced in a social movement as a continual
process of negotiation between different level of
politics and voluntary organizations; and (5) such
collective actions have been successful in maintain-
ing the privileged status of Yogyakarta by imposing
Special Law No.13/2012 (Undang-Undang
Keistimewaan DI Yogyakarta).
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